Tagarchief: Airpower

out-of-the-box solution: LAHAT missile & NEMO mortar!

the continued reliance on close air support – a capability that kept ground troops safe in Afghanistan and Iraq – was a “flawed assumption” for future campaigns.

In my last post I wrote about the necessity to repair the teeth of the Dutch Lion. I argued that the Ministry of Defense often “brags” about number of “Main Weapon Systems” (in the sense of the platforms” but in fact these systems/platforms lack weapon systems, and are often only armed with self defense turrets/guns. The Dutch armed forces – especially the land forces lack offensive capability and depend completely on others and “Airpower” which is an illusion.

Last week these claims I make for years now (to death mans ears some officers are laughing it away, and politicians… well they are just that…) But now a British active duty Brigadier acknowledges these claims….

“Brigadier Simon Humphrey said budget cuts and an over-emphasis on low-end insurgency operations have left Nato forces at risk of being “overwhelmed in the early stages of a high-intensity conflict”.
….
He added that the continued reliance on close air support – a capability that kept ground troops safe in Afghanistan and Iraq – was a “flawed assumption” for future campaigns.

….

An accompanying video presentation declared that “Nato’s rocket and gun platforms are outnumbered, outranged and outgunned by all their likely peer adversaries. The enemy would overwhelm our forces with greater range, volume and access to large-calibre munitions.

“A rocket engagement with a mix of sensor fuzed, thermobaric and proximity munitions against dispersed Nato battle groups would be devastating.” ”

Normally our officers won’t listen, they are proud of their work. They have (when there is money left) some exercises where they “show- off” that the units and Main Weapon Systems” (namely the Boxer, Fennek in it’s strange configurations) Perform well. Their scenarios are met…. Don’t ask how they do it… but they say they do. Well I’ve read some reports about it.. they create a scenario where there (limited) “capabilities” for offensive operations fit in… the scenario… “beautiful weather” scenarios they are. If all goes well, all goes like they planned it… the mission will be accomplished… Sort of Battle of Arnhem scenario… but what if there is a SS Pantzer division in the neighborhood? But now a British respected high ranking (and responsible) Officer claims the same…. So will they believe and act now? (I hope for the best, but expect the worst……)

With this post I want to deepen the concept I foresee with an out-of-the-box approach. This approach is needed in my opinion as a measure to give especially the light infantry forces a defensive and offensive system to decrease dependence on Combat Air Support and third nation capabilities. A combination of the NEMO and LAHAT missile.

Feasibility

In my latest post I mentioned two specific systems: NEMO and LAHAT and the combination of them which is possible…. I asked IAI (a couple of years ago) for this possibility and they replied that since the missile is designed as a Multi-role system it will be possible.

Excerpt from my email questionnaire to IAI:

LAHATlauncerquad

Q: “Could the Nemo (from the Finnish company Patria) fire the LAHAT? Because that would be very interesting to give the Nemo a multi-purpose function. 

A:  “The LAHAT in the canister version may be launched from any platform including the NEMO. The LAHAT in the canister only weights 16 kg, the length is 1 meter and the diameter 12cm. The electrical interface of the LAHAT Interface Unit (LIU) and the platform is very simple. The LAHAT firing envelope is very wide and tolerant and doesn’t request very accurate positioning of the vehicle or complicate operations by the operator”.

Patria, the creator of the NEMO mortar probably wasn’t aware of this but I received this reaction from them:

“I’ll pass the information you sent to our engineers and let’s see what comes out of that. And many thanks!”

Unfortenately I never received any response from the engineers… But the reaction of IAI is clear: Since this is cleared out: the other decision-making factors not included factors like:

  • Political willingness,
  • industry interests
  • The will to do things differently out-of-the-box (imo a real problem in the military). I once had a discussion about the Fennek… to better arm some of the vehicles (with a 25-35 RCWS) to have more Direct-Fire Support firepower for light infantry, recce units etc. the discussion and arguments moved from it isn’t technical possible (definetly wrong-it is why should they otherwise develop the Fennek Stinger WP with a weight of 1500kg?) to >>> There wasn’t a “political” request to do this.. so according to this officer the politicians are leading in what is needed to equip our forces… While imo the military should show to politicians – this is wat’s needed – if not these are the consequences > for your responsibility (towards the soldiers lives and people. But it seems to me the military is lacking the capability to think outside of the box…

It is possible and a real viable solution for countries who currently lack the firepower generated by medium combat vehicles, tanks, a lack of non-availability of Long Range Guided Weapons (LRGW). This combination offers a multi-role solution for several shortfalls. This system can be used in the

Direct Fire-Support function and Indirect Fire-Support function combined from one platform!

The 120mm Patria NEMO mortar.  This system is unique in its capabilities. Of course there are other mortars with a little bit the same capabilities but they are lighter, slower or less capable. Here are some of the features about the turret which is light and compact and easily installable on light, tracked chassis (even like the BVS10 Viking) or wheeled armored vehicles in the 6×6/8×8 class or even boats:

  • A lightweight structure, requiring little space within the platform and, therefore, adjustable for older chassis
  • High rate of fire
  • Rapid response
  • Shoot and scoot
  • Minimal crew (driver + 1 Nemo weapon officer + 2 loaders)
  • Direct fire capability
  • Direct lay capability
  • Suitable for all standard 120 mm smoothbore mortar ammunition
  • Full 360° traverse
  • Joint operations between Patria Nemo and Patria Nemo Navy units
  • A Range of +10km
  • Multiple Round Simultaneous Impact (MRSI, so shoot several rounds, and let them come on the ground at about the same time)

Picture 811

What to choose for the Dutch Armed forces?
Well, the best option would be the AMV from patria itself. But unfortunately, the Dutch military burdened our country (and thus their own operational soldiers) with the Boxer 8×8 vehicle which is even in it’s unarmed configuration overweight, to slow and to expensive. Since these units are intended to support the “light” infantry units (if I had anything to say) My pick would be the BVS10 Viking version. But besides that there is another option… a containerized version…….(isn’t that awesome?) This option could fit on Trucks, Amphibious landing boats (for example LCVP or even faster boats like the Watercat M16, and ofcourse as a base security guard C-RAM system.  I believe the BVS10 Viking would have my preference above the armored truck since it will be better suited for the working environment.

BVS10VikinNemo

Nemo_BvS10

Some of the options this containerized version will give a defense force…… I can tell you It opens a lot of potential… for C-RAM, Base defense, Amphibious and Littoral warfare, Special Forces support…

Patria-Nemo-Container-6 

Nemo_container

 

  • Multi functional LAHAT Missile – JOINT weapon system of choice!
  • My personal favorite however is the Semi Active Laser (SAL) guided LAHAT missile. Because of it’s “low-cost” and multi function / joint capabilities. It has a very low weight (about 13kg) and excellent range about 8km). What is needed is a sytem of “connected” sensors & shooters. Sensors can be handheld, drone, helicopter, (any aircraft with a IR targeting system / Laser Designation System), Mast mounted, vehicle mounted. So the shooter platform doesn’t really have to be the guiding one, guidance can be given by any available sensor platform. The same missile can be used to equip many different platforms:
  • Tanks and NEMO mortars:Unique in its kind, it’s the only missile both capable of firing from a launcher and from a 105 / 120mm gun.  The LAHAT missile is already integrated on Leopard 2A4 tanks as shown in the video here. The LAHAT missile is put in a canister which can be handled as normal ammunition onboard a tank/mortar carrying vehicle. In theory even 105mm artillery guns can be equipped with this as a direct fire solution if needed. Range about 8km.

Lahat_Firing_Leopard_2A4

This out-of-the box solution needs to be arranged also in a organizational way.. These kinds of systems aren’t just “artillery” “Indirect Fire-Support” capabilities but in reality, direct fire-support solutions. This requires that the way of operating, organizing and supporting these units needs, from the bottom up, a maneuver oriented organization.

I believe it should be directly under the battalion commanders control. (through the Combat Fire Support Company (or how the RNLMC thinks it should be called… 😊) It should fit within the DutchForce21 infantry battalion structure. And I promise, I will create a TOE for this…

DutchForce21 plans for:

  • 4 Light Infantry bataljons (marines and air maneuver)
  • 1 Paracomando bataljon (taking NEMO with them is not an option, lightweight vehicles with 81mm mortar and LAHAT launchers will (something like this? RAM KM3)

LAHAt Launcher 2quad

  • 4 Mechanised Infantry bataljons… Yes they can have the NEMO mortar as well….

The Fire Support Companies for both Mechanized and Light Infantry will be different. I come later to that.

Part 3: How to repair the teeth of the Dutch Lion

I wrote a series of three blogs, one about the statistical situational of the personnel of the land forces so Land forces command and the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps. The second blog is an explanation of the Dutch current lack of offensive and eventualy defensive capabilities. In it’s current form it is only able to operate in peace support or police / military training missions and with doing that depending on Airpower and support from other countries. The third piece has some suggestions of what to do to repair these deficiencies and to (re)create teeth…. of the Dutch Lion.

 

And this is the fun part I now give a free advise to the Dutch Land forces… and politicions working on their new goverment… where they promised during the elections to make a real effort of investing in Defense… because they see that the world isn’t that safe… if it ever was..

What the Netherlands Defense forces (on land) need is a combination of capabilities which overlap each other. If we take the worst case scenario – High intensity conflict – you need a combination of systems which are capable of supporting each other on the battlefield. Probably in a dispersed way So no high value targets of massed groupings of units as a sitting duck.

So IMO we do need a system with connected capacities to create an “imaginative” umbrella. An umbrella which is both defensive and offensive. We need:

Direct fire support systems:

  • Heavy caliber = 120 – 140mm main armament (that’s what it really means😊) to be found on (heavy, medium and light) Tanks, and Tank-killers (also wheeled variants available).
  • Lahat_Firing_Leopard_2A4

    The LAHAT missile launched from a German Leopard 2A4 tank..

  • Medium caliber = 20 – 40mm main armament to be found on Infantry Fighting vehicles, Direct Fire support vehicles (also wheeled 4×4, 6×6, 8×8 and 10×10 vehicles available, so also to support Light infantry or Wheeled infantry units.)
  • Small caliber = 0,5 Machine guns, remotely controlled or manual fitted as main weapon on Combat Service Support (CSS) vehicles as it is now, or as secondary armament on Combat Support (CS) vehicles.
  • Multi purpose grenade launchers = 25 – 40mm remotely controlled or manual, fitted as main weapon on Combat Service Support (CSS) vehicles as it is now, or as secondary armament on Combat Support (CS) vehicles.
  • Hand-held grenade launchers (for example 40mm) Infantry weapon
  • Sniper rifles and in some cases Anti Material Rifles (20mm)
  • Assault rifles Infantry 7,62mm standard (a higher standard than the current 5,56mm standard, because of increased range and effectiveness.

Guided Weapons against land targets:

  • Short Range: with a range up to 1km, to be employed by light infantry (YES, we already have these 😊) Pantserfaust and Carl Gustav.
  • Medium Range: with a range up to 2,5km, to employed by light infantry and dismounted (wheeled/mechanized) infantry (We have these as well 😊) Fire & Forget capability Spike MR.
  • Long Range: A capability to be able to fire against targets within a range of 8km this would be a new capability for the Dutch armed forces. They did have the TOW missile from the PRAT YPR vehicle but it had an effective range of 4km. This capability will give maneuver unit the etch against enemy forces because you will be able to hit others while they aren’t normally capable of hitting you back. This would be a decisive capability especially for the Wheeled and light infantry because they normally lack the power of tanks. There are several interesting systems, I would suggest to take two types the Extended range (>8km) and the Non-Line of sight (NLOS) with a range of about 25km. The first one is really essential, the second one would give our forces more punch and lowers the risk. Because we (our soldiers) can strike at a greater range than the enemy would be able to do:
    • Extended range: There are several capable options so there shouldn’t be a predefined option.

Multi functional LAHAT Missile – JOINT weapon system of choice!

LAHATlauncerquad

 

My personal favorite however is the Semi Active Laser (SAL) guided LAHAT missile. Because of it’s “low-cost” and multi function / joint capabilities. It has a very low weight (about 13kg) and excellent range about 8km). What is needed is a sytem of “connected” sensors & shooters. Sensors can be handheld, drone, helicopter, (any aircraft with a IR targeting system / Laser Designation System), Mast mounted, vehicle mounted. So the shooter platform doesn’t really have to be the guiding one, guidance can be given by any available sensor platform. The same missile can be used to equip many different platforms:

  • Helicopter: Even the lightest helicopters can be equipped with long range strike assets, a quadruple launcher weights only 75kg. So this weapon can be used on the LSH and Apache helicopters. In the latter’s case it means that our Apache can fly much further (because of lower weapon loads) while being equipped with a bigger ranged weapon then the current Hellfire missiles (which by the way outprice the LAHAT. Hellfire missiles cost about $ 68.000 a piece versus the LAHAT for about $ 20.000. Because LAHAT would be used by both Land-, Air-, and even Sea command’s it will probably mean we can buy more missiles at lower prices and with less cost for support,  training, storage and other facilities. The range fired from helicopters is about 13km.
  • Drone’s: there are plans underway to integrate LAHAT on Drones. Because of the weight this can be done on both fixed wing and vertical lift drones. And we even don’t have to use the Heavy and over expensive American options, the Dutch military (Air Force is favoring… as usual) The range is also about 13km.
  • Tanks and NEMO mortars: Unique in its kind, it’s the only missile both capable of firing from a launcher and from a 105 / 120mm gun.  The LAHAT missile is already integrated on Leopard 2A4 tanks as shown in the video here. The LAHAT missile is put in a canister which can be handled as normal ammunition onboard a tank/mortar carrying vehicle. In theory even 105mm artillery guns can be equipped with this as a direct fire solution if needed. Range about 8km.
  • Land vehicles:  The LAHAT missile can be put on a “load” platform with several quadruple launchers (weighting about 75kg per for missiles) Or be put in special launchers which can be fired and reloaded under armour. For example in the excellent Israeli RAM MKiii AT version. Range about 8km.
  • Fixed installation / compound C-RAM system: It creates a defensive shield of about 8km surrounding the compound which can react within seconds after sight of incoming enemy fire.
  • Navy applications: There are several potential navy applications thinkable:
    • Main weapon for patrol boats: with quadruple launchers or other form of launching system fixed to a Remotely Controlled Weapon System (RCWS) armed with a 20 – 40mm medium caliber gun or a small caliber gun 0,50 caliber.
    • Amphibious fire support and littoral warfare: The Current Dutch LCVP’s and LCU’s could take quadruple launchers on deck. But in the future it would also be usefull to use Fast attack craft equipped with 120mm NEMO mortar, so such a vessel can be used in both a indirect and direct fire support function. In the Artillery list more about NEMO. The LAHAT will give a patrol-, amphibious- and littorals force hugh potential and fighting power, which also means security and protection for the soldiers. This also means the high value targets like amphibious ships and frigates can keep out of close range from the shore while giving the landing force a direct reaction capability which also safes on artillery and support weapons/munition onboard the ships.
    • strb2010_20100224_1563248721

      For Amphibious operations and Littoral operations the RNLN / RNLMC team need more and better equiped small vessels like this Alucraft Watercat M18

    • Defensive use: as secondary weapon in the C-RAM and “swarming boats” roles on bigger ships like frigates, replenishment ships and amphibious vessels. This option could even be used on “civil” merchant vessels in the case of anti-piracy or convoy duty.
  • Non Line of Sight (NLOS): this type is somehow able to fill a gap between MLRS and LRGW functions) The Spike NLOS has a range of about 25km, is wire-guided and it is also possible to use for both strike and reconnaissance functions. While flying over / towards a target it films everything on it’s way, so it would be an interesting ISTAR asset. The missile can be re-tasked during flight. This weapon can also be made available in a helicopter version and can be used to equip vessels and small boats.
  • images

 

Artillery: Indirect fire support systems:

  • 60mm Mortar not very much to talk about here. Range about 1km
  • 81mm mortar This should become as it used to be, the indirect fire support weapon for the light infantry only. So the amphibious-, air maneuver- and para commando infantry units as well as some for special forces operations should be integrated in the lowest possible level, the fire support company of the infantry battalions (or groups). Range about 5,6km.
  • 120mm mortar; These towed 120mm mortars could remain (at least in a more modern version) range 8,1km But I would want to make a strong argument to integrate a new system here in the Netherlands inventory.

 

I would ask your special attention for a very versatile system: the 120mm NEMO mortar

Picture 811

The 120mm Patria NEMO mortar.  This system is unique in its capabilities. Of course there are other mortars with a little bit the same capabilities but they are lighter, slower or less capable. Here are some of the features about the turret which is light and compact and easily installable on light, tracked chassis (even like the BVS10 Viking) or wheeled armored vehicles in the 6×6/8×8 class or even boats:

  • A lightweight structure, requiring little space within the platform and, therefore, adjustable for older chassis
  • High rate of fire
  • Rapid response
  • Shoot and scoot
  • Minimal crew (driver + 1 Nemo weapon officer + 2 loaders)
  • Direct fire capability
  • Direct lay capability
  • Suitable for all standard 120 mm smoothbore mortar ammunition
  • Full 360° traverse
  • Joint operations between Patria Nemo and Patria Nemo Navy units
  • A Range of +10km
  • Multiple Round Simultaneous Impact (MRSI, so shoot several rounds, and let them come on the ground at about the same time)
BVS10VikinNemo

the BVS10 amphibious Amored vehicle could be operational in more roles than currently available. There is this 120mm NEMO mortar version for example.

This weapons is really multifunctional and it’s ability to have Direct fire support is especially enhanced because it is also able to fire the LAHAT missile with a range of +8km[i].

 

  • 105mm Howitzer Not in service at the moment, This could be a capable addition for the Dutch land forces. It’s a light system and could be deployed anywhere even under a medium sized helicopter and in an amphibious role. There are interesting systems on the market which give this weapon a range almost equal to heavier 155mm artillery pieces. One of these sytems is the Suith-African Denel Developed Lion.. (attractive name for the Dutch isn’t it😊)
  • 155mm Howitzer: The current heavy (and I mean really heavy) 155mm Pantzer Houwitzer 2000 is a development from the Cold war. The Dutch army has 60 systems in it’s inventory but only uses 18 of them. (plus some for training I believe). But as I said, they are to heavy. To be honest they can only be used in support of the mechanized 43th Brigade with it’s leased tanks and CV9035 Infantry Fighting Vehciles. The other units won’t receive support from this because they will be to heavy for expeditionary warfighting. The only alternative now are the old 120mm towed mortars but these have realy limited range. So best option would be to take a proven 155mm howitzer which is able to support wheeled and light infantry maneuver verywhere. I believe that one of the qualifications should be that it could be flown into theater, that will be able to support amphibious landings.
  • MLRS

 

I think every General, with or without an armchair, could understand and affirm that this situation is untenable. The time to change is NOW! Or as  John Kotter  puts it:

 

[i] https://www.dropbox.com/s/pg7rbqpzxuugv8s/lahat%20%281%29.pdf?dl=0

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LAHAT

 

 

 

 

Part 2: Offensive capabilities: Toothless = useless!

I write a series of three blogs, one about the statistical situational of the personnel of the land forces so Land forces command and the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps. The second blog is an explanation of the Dutch current lack of offensive and eventualy defensive capabilities. Here is part two.

Part 2: Offensive capabilities needed: Toothless = useless!

Besides looking at the “numbers” or to be more specific: “number of soldiers” in fighting and support functions, one other very – not to neglect area – are the weapons and systems they need to fight. We can be short of the capabilities of the Dutch Army and marines to fight (battles not Peace support missions): almost none. And then I’m not talking about the lack of reserve parts, lack of training hours/days and the lack of oil/fuel (and in this case personnel).

The Dutch armed forces lack the capabilities to fight. They can do peace (support) missions, “police” or “training” missions but they can’t do what they are meant for. Especially the Land forces. There is one Brigade which has some form of fighting power, the 43th Brigade with their CV9035 vehicles with 35mm canons. we lease a couple of tanks, and they have support of 120mm (oldies) and 155mm Artillery pieces. On paper… very posh paper (of the Dutch Ministry of Defense) they also have Fennek MRAT, Fennek Mortar and Boxer 8×8 vehicles but all of these aren’t able to fire on the move or only have defensive weapons…. Our Fennek MRAT can only deploy in ambush.. were the soldier have to leave the vehicle to fire his or her missile (1 launcher 2 vehicles with total 10 missiles….) run back to safety… and move on.. This isn’t ofcourse what the army is telling our parliamentarians. (if they even care about it….) If parliamentarians and their political assistants where smart AND interested they would have noticed that while first the Boxer was the only vehicle capable for the MRAT role, but then suddenly the Fennek was capable as well. In between, sort of secretive they changed the specs… and there you have it, the Fennek MRAT was borne. No instead they are only creating lists of “Hoofdwapensystemen” hmmmm.. a Dutch word and I tell you what it means: “Main Armament/Weapon systems”.

Main Armament/Weapon systems Lists

With the word “Armament” or “weapon” you create the illusion that it is about some form of deadly overwhelming and of course hyper modern piece of art… system. (Because that’s also what they claim, for our boys and girls only the best is good enough….. we don’t want to bring them into dangerous situations now do we?)

The use of these words put politicians (and civilians) on the wrong track. They read the number of main armament/weapon systems and think… owh do we have that much? No problem… The parliamentarians do look at the “availability” numbers (which are shockingly low), but there isn’t a list that measures effectiveness and “capabilities”.  So we have to consider that most of these systems on these lists don’t really have offensive capabilities. The tooth has fallen out of the lions mouth.

The Dutch Toothless Lion

What do I mean with: ‘the tooth has fallen out of the mouth of the lion’? (Yes we have an Orange Lion as a mascot😊)? Let’s briefly go down the list:

Capacity / weapon system availability Observations
Tanks (direct firing range 3km Some, only for 43th brigade with some tanks leased from the German Bundeswehr. We sold ours (about 100 directly after modernizing them to the 2A6 standard) for peanuts to Finland.
Close range air defense /(PRTL/Cheetah 35mm) Sold to Jordan (directly after modernizing them to the newest standard) ncluding all 35mm cartridges which where initialy the reason for buying the specifacly adapted CV90 “35” with extra costs.Instead of the standard available 30mm or 40mm as the Sweden have themselves.
Multiple Lounge Rocket System (MLRS) We had some good systems bud sold them because we thought we didn’t need it. These we also sold for peanuts to Finland.
PH2000 155mm Self-propelled Howitzers YES, finally we have a lot of them, 60, of which only 18 in use.. Oh, and they are so heavy they probably can’t support the 11th, 13th Brigades and the RNLMC…They have to do with old 120mm mortars..
Long Range Anti Tank / PRAT (TOW) The Dutch Army doesn’t have these Anti Tank weapons anymore. There currently is no capability of firing on-the-move + firing (and reloading) from under armor! We do have the small Fenneks with Spike missiles (placed on an imperial on the Roof.. for goodness sake☹) but they only have a range of 2,5km. And they go in small numbers. So no, we don’t have any relevant capability anymore.
120mm mortars Low availability, the whole ground forces Army and Marines have to share the same small number of mortars. So limited availability and I have to say, limited range.

These weapons form the backbone of Dutch Artillery while they used to be the heavy weapons of infantry battalions. No smart ammunition. Also no direct fire capability.

81mm mortars Reasonably available within infantry units, no smart ammunition available.
Medium caliber weapons  – only CV9035 There are only 2 battalions equipped with these vehicles. This means that only the 43th Brigade has these offensive capable vehicles. The other “wheeled” Brigade has to do with unarmed  or lightly armed (say 0,50 caliber) machine guns. What about the fighting capability of the Wheeled and Airmobile units?
Small caliber weapons These are normally fitted to a lot of the “Main Armament/Weapon systems” BUT purely in a defensive / supportive role. And this is the main problem for the Dutch land forces.

only one comment for the pictures here… (lose) promisses nothing more…

In my opinion this is a very scary situation. In a realistic and modern combat scenario we… the Dutch… won’t have a chance, without the help of others. It’s not even so we don’t have enough… we don’t have it!

Dutch armed forces need tooth ‘and’ tail

I write a series of three blogs, one about the statistical situational of the personnel of the land forces so Land forces command and the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps. The second blog is an explanation of the Dutch current lack of offensive and eventualy defensive capabilities. In it’s current form it is only able to operate in peace support or police / military training missions and with doing that depending on Airpower and support from other countries. The third piece has some suggestions of what to do to repair these deficiencies and to (re)create teeth…. of the Dutch Lion.

Part 1 Statistics and ratios: tooth-to-tail

A comparison of the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps(RNLMC) and the Land Forces Command (CLAS) is in my view appropriate. Since both organizations operate on “land”, and provide most of the fillings / units in the framework of international missions. One other reason I would like to do this is because, how “well meant” the use of military for peace building is, the real purpose of the military is to be a “security” instrument in the hands of the democratic elected government… with my own words added … in the best interest of the people. In short military are there to fight… and win, when the situation and circumstances are unknown. So a military which can only be “employed” under normal or best calculated circumstances, is not able to do the job.

In my opinion there are two important factors for an effective fighting force. I deliberately not talking about others like, training, doctrine, organization command&control, logistics (in the sense of how to organize it). The two factors I want to talk about now is the Tooth to Tail ratio and the offensive capabilities of the Dutch armed forces as it is. In my last blog I already mentioned an overall vision for what is needed for an expeditionary capable force. In this blog I want to focus on the land forces capability especially. There is some overlap.

‘With the word “Armament” or “weapon” you create the illusion that it is about some form of deadly overwhelming and of course hyper modern piece of art… system’.

Tooth to Tail ratio

To calculate the tooth-to-tail ratio I look at some numbers/details of the ministry of Defense below. If we share the other units by the number of personnel assigned to the maneuver units, for the CLAS we see a ratio of 1 to 3.8, and the RNLMC 1: 0.87 or in other words behind each “individual” combat Army/CLAS soldier (tooth) there are 3,8 supporting soldiers (tail). While with the RNLMC the ratio is 0.87 supportive soldier. Of course we have to note here that the RNLMC are supported (on operations) by Army supportive soldiers as well.

 

2013 overview

Maneuver units in 2013 Formation formation% Battalions % of battalions
CLAS 3841    72,6% 7    77,8%
RNLMC 1452    27,4% 2    22,2%
Total 5293 100,0% 9 100,0%

 

I have looked into figures from 2013 and 2014. I didn’t have time to look into newer numbers but we can imagine that it will be significantly harder after the implementation of cuts and the number of soldiers leaving the armed forces.

 

2014 overview

Maneuver units in 2013 Formation formation% Battalions % of battalions
CLAS 3325   69,6% 7    77,8%
RNLMC 1452   30,4% 2    22,2%
Total 4777 100,0% 9 100,0%

 

But if we look at the proportions of the armed forces as a whole … then something is still not right. The CZSK has around 7914 soldiers with about 2,800 Marines. The CLAS has around 18,546 troops … If we want to know the right operational output, we see that only ¼ of the maneuver units among the 21,346 soldiers are belonging to the Tooth of the military. 75% or ¾ of the military operates within the CS, CSS, administration, training and so on. I deliberately not looking into the figures of the civil staff, the MOD and it’s services and the Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF) and Royal Marechaussee (Military Police force a semi military unit with mostly civil security tasks like protection of the Airports and borders).

Totals Maneuver vs Other

Operational Command Total servicemen % Maneuver % Other %
CLAS 18546   86,88 3841 72,6 14705 92,12
NAVY(RNLMC) 2800 12,12 1452 27,4 1258 7,88
Total 21346 100,0 5293 100,0 15963 100,0
25%   75%

 

But there is more, If we look at the individual components, we see that the CLAS scores lower than 25%, with only 20.71% and 51.86% for the Marines (RNLMC). That makes you wonder doesn’t it? Of course I know the Land forces have a lot more, Staff, Special Forces, CS and CSS units. Beside CLAS has a lot of nonmilitary tasks and is responsible for the (civil) security regions and the National Reserve. But still…..

Totals CLAS vs RNLMC

Operational Command CLAS RNLMC
  Serviceman % Serviceman %
Maneuver 3841 20,71 1452 51,86
Other 14705 79,29 1348 48,14
Total 18546 100,0 2800 100,0

 

Oh yes, the reaction of the military and politicians will be… yeah but look at how other countries do it! Well that’s not going to help us when we need military units with accompanying capabilities.

 

 

Do you know what a SLOC is?

Well it stands for Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC) and it’s more important than you may think. in this age of digital worldwide web, we (and our governments) seem to have forgotten how we get our stuff and all the things we need to live from A to B. Yes you may order your things on Internet, through Ebay, Amazon or some fancy Chinese webstores. But the next thing will be to ship it from A(sia) to B (or Europe:) ofcourse most of these goods come to Europe through our Dutch Main port of Rotterdam. Yes im proud of that.

Well just see and observe this visualization of the world’s shipping routes

“Just remember what DutchForce21 is all about. A maritime focus to (Dutch) armed forces, just because this is the reality.”

About 11 billion tons of stuff gets carried around the world every year by large ships. Clothes, flat-screen TVs, grain, cars, oil — transporting these goods from port to port is what makes the global economy go ‘round.

And now there’s a great way to visualize this entire process, through this stunning interactive map from the UCL Energy Institute

Some previous articles:

Solutions:

Nederlandse toevoeging:

Iedereen die dit fimpje ziet, begrijpt hopelijk direct waarom Dutchforce21 de krijgsmacht een maritieme focus wil geven! En ook waarom dit op een expeditionaire manier zal moeten… en dus de JSF totaal ongeschikt is!!

Lees de serie:

 

 

Saab Gripen E/F/G: the true modular force (soon available in Sea Gripen taste)

Everybody who reads DutchForce21 regularly knows that i am very positive about the Saab Gripen E/F proposal. This is based on my comparison (as far as possible based on public intel) but also on the logical assumptions / goals i have for the DutchForce21 concept.

breakingthecostcurve_Eng_700

  • As i stated such a force should be expeditionary in nature.
  • Be cost effective
  • consist of enough units and (weapon) systems to operate effectively.
  • And most importantly, I imagine a future where the fighting will be about… oil and rare earth materials.. Our current western societies can’t live without them.

GripenENLoh0pat

(We therefore need a force which can deploy fast (but short) to support especially maritime domain to escort and secure (Dutch / European) Merchant vessels on their way back from the world to our port’s of … Rotterdam or vice versa. We need a maritime focused defence force but not only the vessels. We also need maritime patrol aircraft, good and enough helicopters or other rotorcraft and… yes.. a Expeditionary capable fighter.. which doesn’t need a luxurious Main Operating base with all the acclimatized hangars (to protect the aircraft as in the case of the JSF)  As this must / should be done in the most “green” way… Why should a country invest in a military to secure fuel and raw materials…. if that same military would “eat” (consume) all these things which are also needed by society?

“Why should a country invest in a military to secure fuel and raw materials…. if that same military would “eat” (consume) all these things which are also needed by society?”

LM is good in Public relations
Many JSF fans and parrots who just are repeating what they heard from Lockheed Martin’s Public Relations division (a muli billion company i can imagine because all the faults, all the problems and all future  scams… need a lot of talking (like Brugman) to convince politicians, and our interested civilians that the only alternative is the JSF. Only the JSF can do…… blabla. And the 5th generation…. (nonsense)

JSF-AMRAAM-490x277

The JSF isn’t multi-role, Result: Ill equipped Dutch Armed forces
But we now know that the JSF, can’t fight a dog  (as in dogfight) they aren’t that good in supporting our ground forces (Combat Air Support) the JSF F35A is armed with 182 25mm bullets. For a 4 barrel canon firing 3000 rounds a minute.. this is only enough ammo for 3,64 seconds.

Besides this I really would be honest to raise the claim that in a cost/benefit analysis (I know… purely hypothetical and without any emotions…. Just like some politicians right?) could it be possible that it would be too expensive to risk the loss of one (of the 35 + 2 testaircraft) JSF vs a (let’s say a platoon which where deprived of their integrated heavy weapons (LR Guided Weapons like TOW, heavy Mortars, used to be a Bataljon asset now it’s heavy artillery) to give a few examples. All these measures were taken because of the promise that there always will be Combat Air Support available.. what if? (+ almost 200 – 300 million Euro’s a piece vs. the (financial) cost to cope with some casualties? Not an option? Why do you think politics is called dirty?

Back to the JSF
The only things they are good for, from a Dutch point of view are… Intelligence gathering, strategic bombing (if enemy radar/IRST are outdated) and buying US soldiers to die for our needs. (because that’s what the JSF is ultimately about. We buy ourselves: the Support and protection by our US Allies – as promised. Unfortunately the US government and their “bread masters” (the same as with TTIP) the US Global Internationals don’t always serve our interests. Of course this is the same with our European allies…. but there is one single interest all European countries share… we live on the same continent which is under threat at the moment.

“But there is one single interest all European countries share… we live on the same continent which is under threat at the moment.”

The best option available
I propose the Saab Gripen fighter which would become available with many different future options. and to certain extend the Netherlands would/could/should become a big partner in this program.

We would have the standard E and F versions. But as we know now the Brazilians are also looking for an Aircraft Carrier capable fighter: the Sea Gripen. (based on E/F developments).

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They say…. steel is cheap
To be really honest, an aircraft carrier for the Netherlands in first sight looks like a step too far. But Personally I think there are certain things about Carrier development which look like they are that expensive on purpose… to earn money for the developers. Not to deliver as much capability as possible for the best price. I’m really interested how the Brazilian military will develop their new carrier.  I know of certain technologies which could be implied for example instead of the New US Catapult system (EMALS) there is a improved version of the current system possible. if they only would invest (a relative) small amount in that development. Besides operating our own carrier I suppose we could also opt for operating carrier capable aircraft in cooperation with our French, Brazilian and US allies. Being a true trustworthy partner with that.

BSAC185

The Gripen E/F already has a promising EW/INTEL gathering capability proposed. As I quoted before the option to combine the AESA radar with the IRST and IFF sensor systems make it an incredible system also claimed capable of tracking (enemy) Stealth targets.  Also the weapons currently integrated on the C/D and future E/F are interesting and capable. Like Meteor and RBS15 MKIII. Some future systems proposed (like a Meteor Anti-Radiation variant) or a RBS15 MK IV a missile with possible 1000km range)  are very interesting future developments.

And now there is this new development I would like to share…..

Meanwhile, long-term commercial plans are assessing the viability of converting a variant of Gripen into an electronic warfare (EW) variant similar to how Boeing has adapted the F/A-18F Super Hornet into the EA-18G Growler.

“If you look into future combat scenarios, if you have a high-end air force with a broad threat situation, something like a ‘Growler Gripen’ would make a real difference,” Sindahl said.

“That‘s what we’re looking into, and that’s why it’s so good to have Brazil on board with the F-model.”

GripenFARP imagesCA3MIC9T

So we have an expeditionary, cost effective modular fighter, which makes it possible to buy enough of them, to operate them well within O&S budget which will also address the SEAD/DEAD needs of our Defence force?    Oh boy, Will those Air Force guys ever learn what they did to our Armed Forces and to greater extend our ability as a nation to act sovereign?  The political leadership destroyed the whole Armed forces (which used to be equipped in a multi-role way, A toolbox with overlapping capabilities) in favor of an aircraft which promised a lot, but in the end will damage our own interests. Why, tell me why the US would always keep our interests in mind and weight them evenly important as they do with their own (national) interests? Why? NOT.

I propose a new future look into what the Dutch military really needs. What kind of force structure is needed? What kind of weapons are needed to create a protected force capable and effective. I think a sustainable “green” fighting force which uses less (natural) resources will be best. I think Gripen E/F/G and Sea Gripen (also in E/F/G options) would be key in such a future force!

And A Dutch Aircraft carrier (or two) is a dream as long as it’s a dream! It could become reality if the politicians and force planners would decide to do so.. without selling increasing the price and wanting to develop the wheel themselves. And most importantly the Military industry has a supportive and facilitating role.. they should earn their fair amount of money doing so, but in the end, the interests of the (Dutch) people is key!  In the mean time I will try to develop the DutchForce alternative force plan. with a financial chapter. (if i have time)

De defensiebegroting 2016: enkele korte conclusies en commentaren

JSF en de rest
Het mag duidelijk zijn. De JSF drukt wel degelijk op andere projecten. (met dank aan Marineschepen.nl) Ook is duidelijk dat de kosten voor het JSF programma hoger gaat uitvallen. Dit is te wijten aan de dollar koers beweert de minister. Dat is niet zo gek want men gebruikte bij de plannen van vorig jaar een zeer onrealistische koers. Weer een voorbeeld van hoe Nederland in de JSF gerommeld wordt. Maart dit jaar schreef ik er al over:

Zie waar een tunnelvisie en politiek gedreven MICC projecten toe leiden. En dat tegen een prachtige dollarkoers van 0,763 nietwaar? Nou eerder €1 = $1 oeps! Maar laat u niet weerhouden deze waarschuwing te lezen. Ja Jack en Mat… ook jij/jullie… want wie draagt er meer verantwoordelijkheid voor dit debacle dan de lobbyende geld verslindende en belastinggeld verkwanselende CDA, VVD en LPF (voormalig) politici die nu hun kost verdienen met de JSF aanschaf?

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Dit soort stiekeme slimmigheidjes is aan de orde van de dag:

  • 85 JSF was eerst het plan (Klu had behoefte aan 114 toestellen claimde men toen (we spreken over t/m 2013/2014), men rekende ons altijd mooie prijzen voor… toen werden het er ineens 35 (plus 2 testtoestellen) voor het zelfde bedrag….
  • De Exploitatie ging van € 275 miljoen per jaar voor 68 F-16 (vanaf 2 vliegbasis plus detachement in de VS) naar € 270 miljoen voor 35 + 2 testtoestellen als het gaat om de JSF…. (let wel de JSF zou staan aan het begin van zijn levenscyclus, de F16 aan het einde… de praktijk leert ons dat de jaarlijkse kosten incrementeel  (tenzij de aantallen toestellen afnemen of er minder vluchten plaats vinden…. Maar dat lijkt me met 37 toestellen niet de bedoeling.
  • Vorig jaar nadat dit door de kamer was goedgekeurd en de eerste bestelling voor 8 JSF was doorgedrukt kwam ineens naar buiten dat dit bedrag zou stijgen naar € 285 per jaar.
  • De begroting voor aanschaf van 37 JSF zou zo’n beetje gelijk blijven (die steeg toen een klein beetje) Maar dus met een zeer onrealistische dollarkoers. En wat zien we nu..?
  • Juistem, een flinke stijging van zo’n € 550 miljoen euro (wat kan oplopen omdat de dollar koers niet vastligt. Vandaar ook dat de minister het prijspeil niet aanpast (wat op zich logisch is) maar wat kan betekenen dat men dit pas bij de laatste bestelling zal doen… met vele honderden miljoenen extra tot gevolg.
  • Wat verder opvalt is dat vrijwel alle materieel projecten worden uitgesteld…. behalve de bestelling voor de JSF>… wie zegt dat de vervanging van de JSF belangrijker is dan die van de andere krijgsmachtdelen?>
  • Wie zegt dat de JSF op het moment van invoeren dan ook niet weer een dure aanvullende capaciteitsuitbreiding nodig heeft… zoals de huidige plannen (in de VS) voorzien in nieuwe sensorapparatuur ?)
  • Nog een leuk gevalletje van onjuist handelen van de JSF kliek (luchtmachtmilitairen, ambtenaren, VVD/CDA politici en industriëlen. Het presenten van de JSF als de enige echte multirole fighter… De Amerikanen zien de JSF zelf echter als een Strategische bommenwerper die de luchtverdediging/bescherming van de F22 nodig heeft, aldus voormalig U.S. Air Force Air Command chief, General Michael Hostage:

“If I do not keep that F-22 fleet viable, the F-35 fleet frankly will be irrelevant. The F-35 is not built as an air superiority platform. It needs the F-22,” says Hostage to Air Force Times.

  • Zo kan ik nog wel even doorgaan….

Fundamenteel probleem
Kortom de hele krijgsmacht gaat gebukt onder de JSF last.. dit is niet slechts een kwestie van meer geld voor defensie. dit is een fundamenteel probleem binnen defensie (dus niet alleen bij de luchtmacht). Iets anders dat opvalt is het feit dat de landmacht nog altijd veel meer te besteden krijgt in operationele zin. vreemd omdat alle dure exploitatie bij de landmacht inmiddels zijn wegbezuinigd (ten gunste dus van de JSF en gevechtshelikopters- dit is terecht als je kijkt waar met name de offensieve capaciteiten zich bevinden. dit is niet meer binnen de landstrijdkrachten!) Dit betekend dat de landmacht slechts een vulling van militairen is, infanterie en logistieke ondersteuning.. allemaal bedoeld als vulling van vredesmissies… De offensieve capaciteit Artillerie en Special Forces resteren. Precies zoals de nitwits van de Luchtmacht het willen ,. High on tech, low boots on the ground. kortom Special Forces en JSF zullen het appeltje wel schillen in de toekomst…. juist?

Conclusie
Mijn conclusie: de Tweede Kamer laat het gewoon gebeuren dat de krijgsmacht nog verder wegzakt. We gaan gewoon door op de weg die al jaren geleden ingeslagen is. Defensie is een verkapte subsidieverstrekking voor de industrie, een manier om de VS te pleasen en een manier om internationaal wat aanzien en goodwill te verwerven. De Luchtmacht levert de facto 1 á 2 squadrons JSF volledig ingebed in de USAF al ware het de tweede Wereldoorlog. Keuze voor de JSF impliceert dat we volledig afhankelijk zijn van de Amerikanen op het gebied van training, EW database, inlichtingen, bewapening en updates. Autonomie en soevereiniteit zijn er in naam wellicht wel, in de praktijk zal dat niet meer zo kunnen zijn. Gewoonweg omdat de Amerikanen dat niet toestaan… Vreemd dat veel partijen dit aan Europa niet toevertrouwen (terecht) maar dit dus blijkbaar aan de Amerikanen wel durven in te leveren?

Flow of goods Europe

De hoofdtaak – verdediging van de Nationale (burger) belangen en het gemeenschappelijke grondgebied (is dus het continent Europa) lijkt hiermee niet langer een hoofdtaak te zijn. Ook de partijen die zeggen meer geld voor Defensie te willen laten dit gewoon gebeuren, ze halen hun politieke punten (tijdens de nabeschouwingen) binnen en daarmee is het afgedaan. Totdat er een grote crisis ontstaat waaruit zal blijken dat de huidige capaciteiten niet toereikend. Zijn. Den Haag zal moord en brand schreeuwen… wie is verantwoordelijk? Wel er zal zullen wel wat mensen verantwoordelijk worden gehouden… de laagste rangen van de hogere rangen zullen wel het haasje zijn… de politiek verantwoordelijken zijn er dan niet meer… en de industriëlen… ach… die hebben de zakken gevuld. De focus op “Airpower’ is in mijn optiek een verkeerde aanname… (de aanname is dat het luchtwapen alle dimensies kan bestrijden… ) de aanname gaat echter mank op een aantal punten:

  • Airpower is niet 24/7 en/of onder alle omstandigheden beschikbaar! Zeker niet met de kleine aantallen JSF en Apache. Wie geeft grondtroepen direct vuursteun op het moment dat het nodig is? In storm of regen, sneeuw of hitte…. Of tijdens een onweersbui? De tank is er niet meer! De landmacht beschikt niet meer over geleide wapens die vanonder pantser kunnen worden afgevuurd alleen de Fennek MRAT, waarbij men eerst het voertuig moet verlaten… wil men het wapen gebruiken.. dit kost tijd.. logisch toch? De gewone infanterie bataljons beschikken niet langer over de 120mm mortieren, dat is verheven tot …. Artillerie. De 155mm zware houwitsers zijn te groot en te zwaar en zullen dus niet altijd ingezet (kunnen) worden… en daarbij we gebruiken er nog maar 18 (ipv 60)
  • Inzet van infanterie tijden buitenlandse missies precies zoals Srebrenica waarbij men er vanuitgaat dat het te allen tijde rendabel is om JSF te gebruiken danwel deze te riskeren: In het kader van bovenstaande is met name de alinea: Cost and Riskinteressant! Lees alle artikelen van het blog: Safe te Royal Navy.org
  • Verkeerd concept gekozen: high tech – low boots on the ground: versus het Payloads over platforms concept. Waarbij voldoende zeer goed platforms zijn die modulair kunnen worden uitgerust met benodigde sensoren en wapens. (voordeel van dit concept is dat men over voldoende voortzettingsvermogen kan beschikken. Dit concept gaat uit van modulariteit en kwantiteit.. het andere concept gaat uit van superioriteit. (het jammere hieraan is dat superioriteit nooit lang of volledig bestaat) neem Stealth – ooit het summum van techniek.. inmiddels is duidelijk dat er diverse methodes zijn om stealth waar te nemen en uit te schakelen. De JSF is stealth maar heeft daarvoor concessies gedaan aan prestaties…. De Saab GripenE is een voorbeeld van zo’n modulair platform van hardware tot software is dit toestel ontwikkeld voor toekomstige uitbreiding. De computer is dezelfde als de JSF… maar de software zal slechts 40% van de computer vullen. De vele miljoen regels code bij de JSF zullen er echter voor zorgen dat de JSF binnen enkele jaren een nieuwere, grotere, wellicht zwaardere computer nodig zal hebben…..

FIA Saab slide 8 FIA Saab slide 9

  • De dreiging rondom Europa, en rekening houdend met de economische belangen en de levensbehoefte van de Europese bevolking is met name tegen te gaan door maritieme dominantie – op lange (lees Atlantische oceaan) en middellange (lees Noordzee en Middellandse zee) afstand van Europa. Hier komt 95% van onze handel vandaan via o.a. Rotterdam. De JSF ontbreekt het aan bereik, en altijd maar dure lucht tanker ondersteuning is niet rendabel.

threats to europeinternational-maritime-route

  • De JSF kan wellicht in alle dimensies invloed uitoefenen mits men over de juiste wapens beschikt.. en dit zegt men er niet bij… die wapens zijn er niet en zullen er niet gauw komen (Waarom?  €€€€€€€€€€€€= daarom!).

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  • De JSF is juist een toestel waarbij juist diverse huidige wapens niet langer gebruikt kunnen worden… omdat de integratie van die wapens door de VS ver voor zich uit zijn geschoven. En sommige wapens niet zullen worden geïntegreerd. De huidige wapens die geïntegreerd worden zijn: GBU-31, GBU-12, nog niet zover maar ook de SDB zal er in passen.
  • Alleen de AMRAAM kan straks nog passen in de JSF. (initieel niet omdat we nu de 120B gebruiken JSF beoogt 120C)
  • Voor zover mij bekend passen alle Nederlandse wapens incl de in aanschaf zijnde SDB onder de Gripen.
  • Zowel de Reccelite als de Litening II targeting pods zijn nu al geïntegreerd op de Gripen C/D en dus met vrij weinig moeite ook op de GripenE. beide systemen zijn operationeel in Nederlandse dienst.
  • Voor Rafale en EF ligt dat idd wel iets anders.
  • Voor de JSF zijn ook infrastructurele aanpassingen nodig, dit is niet het geval bij F-16, Gripen E en Rafale. Dus dit “verwijt” aan het adres van de F/A-18 Super Hornet is een beetje grappig. Bekijk bijvoorbeeld het rapport Uitstapkosten JSF van het ARK maar eens, tabel 7 en tabel 8 staan diverse infrastructurele kosten benoemt: VOOR DE JSF!

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