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Comments on the RNLN plans

In the first blog I pointed to the JSF and reasoned that I don’t believe the positive quote ‘Now it is our decade’. In the second part I tried to look into the plans which where shown in an article.

The Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN) is planning the replacement of its mine countermeasures (MCM) vessels, its M-Frigates and replacement of its four Walrus class submarines.

With this third blog I will write something about the problems (which I already talked about in a previous blog) the delusional High technological – high cost (mostly poor quality (you won’t believe it) but high budget and high results for shareholders of the MIC) part which is meant for intervention, stand-off ranges… in short best described as the Joint Strike Fighter concept. In this blog I will focus on the implications for the RNLN. In order to do this I will point out that the Navy has good quality ships(units) but in to small numbers.

Concessions not capabilities
People who have read my blog know that I’m not a fan of the OPV (Holland class) and JSS (karel Doorman class). And that’s because I believe that these were more political and industrial oriented concession projects. First of all, I believe that we should have kept the incredible robust MP frigates as they where. The ministry of Defense (while it should be a political decision) used this argument that they where to costly with big manning costs.. but these costs – on the total cost of sailing a (big) vessel are peanuts. And that’s the same for an OPV or a frigate. The MP Frigates could sail with a smaller crew of about 80 people on “coast guard missions” instead of about 150 people in full war configuration> This ability is lost with the great OPV’s.

The OPV’s are solutions for tasks and have a performance profile that could have easily been done by less costly ships. They are classes of ships full of concessions. I said it many times before. The Dutch (and you can fill in most of the NATO member countries except US but included the UK) have created a split in two parts of Defense:  the High technological – high cost (mostly poor quality but high budget and high results for shareholders of the MIC) part which is meant for intervention, stand-off ranges… in short best described as the Joint Strike Fighter concept….and the second part is the “good for peace & security operations” forces.. called UN peace keepers… they (the soldiers believing in these concepts) imagine to be capable of warfighting… for the public and the politicians.. but they can’t… Why because they depend on the ideal (calculated) scenario’s if everything goes as planned…. Neglecting Murphy”s law.  Just read my last blog and the quote of Brigadier Simon Humphrey (British Army/UK)

“Brigadier Simon Humphrey said budget cuts and an over-emphasis on low-end insurgency operations have left Nato forces at risk of being “overwhelmed in the early stages of a high-intensity conflict”.
He added that the continued reliance on close air support – a capability that kept ground troops safe in Afghanistan and Iraq – was a “flawed assumption” for future campaigns.


An accompanying video presentation declared that “Nato’s rocket and gun platforms are outnumbered, outranged and outgunned by all their likely peer adversaries. The enemy would overwhelm our forces with greater range, volume and access to large-calibre munitions.

“A rocket engagement with a mix of sensor fuzed, thermobaric and proximity munitions against dispersed Nato battle groups would be devastating.” ”

Remember what is really wrong with the Dutch armed forces:

What I mean is that the Dutch armed forces – especially the land forces lack offensive capability and depend completely on others and “Airpower” which is an illusion. But also the Royal Netherlands navy lacks capabilities.. 

I am aware that it isn’t the same “problem” as the Army has which has a complete lack of offensive weapon systems.. No the Netherlands navy indeed has capable frigates, it’s Submarines are very good: unmatched in capabilities and quality, they form a special class on their own, since most of the other submarines are much smaller and the Walrus class ships are capable of transiting much greater distances on their own without any help. The current class of Mine Counter Measure (MCM) ships are also very good. The problem with the navy is especially that the force mix is to small to have enough ships available for the “four stroke” which is needed to be able to train for the worst… that’s what our fighting forces are for. Units need to be able to do peacekeeping (and other secondary role) missions, but also train for worst case scenario’s and that’s the point, there are to few ships, and to low on crews to do that. This in combination with the policies of the governments since 2008 have been disastrous for all branches (even the Air Force with their continued focus on ALL AMERICAN (in)doctrine, equipment and their fight on (terror and money for the MIC).  There used to be a capability mix of different kind of systems which together formed a system of systems… It was called a layered defense. That’s all gone now. We have just one layer with offensive capabilities and some disguised / fake layers without any capacities what so ever. Back to the Navy, we came from a force structure with lots of fighting ships – support vessels – Mine Counter measure vessels – integrated Marine units – maritime patrol aircraft – naval helicopters… a complete and cooperative layered team effort.

In a blog from a couple of years ago (2014) I reflected on the Dutch navy situation compared with 2004 >  Focusing on the key area of Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW).

  The last couple of years… well almost 10 to 20 years, many European governments, like the Dutch government seem to have forgotten why we need a well-equipped war fighting capable navy. A new trend have arose where full fletched destroyers, frigate’s and corvettes have been replaced by so called Ocean capable  (a term also used: Offshore) Patrol Vessels. These vessels are mostly capable of operating in a coastguard role, with some weaponry and sensors and often helicopter facilities.  One of the main area’s which this “rebalancing” of fleets have led to is a large diminish of Anti-Submarine warfare capabilities. The European navies decreased the number of submarines, submarine hunting vessels, Anti-Submarine Maritime Patrol Aircraft and Helicopters capable of these important tasks.  Besides that navies tend to invest less in training hours for these kind of operations. Why? The threat of the Soviet fleets have disappeared right? To give you an example: The Dutch Navy in 2004 (ten years ago) had:

  • 13 (around 2004 it where 10)P3C Orion Maritime Patrol Aircraft in the latest modernisation standard. These aircraft where capable of searching and destroying submarines and surface vessel at great range and long endurance. Also capable of Search and Rescue (SAR) missions. Later some were improved for operation over land (EW and SIGINT operations)
  • 24 owned (during 2004 they had 22)SH-14D Lynx naval helicopter These helicopters where integrated on naval frigates and surface ships to help defend and hunt enemy submarines to secure the vicinity of own and friendly ships, both military and merchant vessels in convoy. These helicopters were also used for SAR, Special Forces Insertion, Transport and security operations (like Operation Atalanta)
  • Surface vessels: The Dutch Navy had several types of surface vessels which are capable of Anti-Submarine warfare, with or without naval helicopters.
    • 2x Replenishment ships capable of carrying 2 Lynx helicopters and loads of Aircraft fuels, spares and torpedo’s
    • 1x Air defence frigate with Torpedo tubes, and sonar
    • 7x Multi purpose Frigates with Torpedo tubes, and a bow sonar and equipped with one Lynx helicopter. Besides the hull mounted sonar these frigates are also fitted with a special towed sonar specifically intended for Anti Submarine Warfare. (Anaconda DSBV-61A towed array sonar)
    • 2x Landing Platform Dock ship with the secondary capability of operating as an ASW command and support ship with room for 6x naval helicopters.
    • 4xAir defence and Command Frigates. These are armed with hull mounted sonars
  • Submarines:4x Walrus class submarines armed with torpedo’s and if necessary armed with Harpoon Anti Ship missiles (never bought by the Dutch Navy though).

If we look at the current status of the Dutch Navy… don’t fall of your chairJ I start with the actual decrease/increase (if there is any) by – xx! or + xx!

  • – 13!No more MPA; all sold to Germany (8) and Portugal (5). These aircraft replaced older/other aircraft so in the end EU/NATO decreased this important capability.
  • – 8!ASW capable helicopters; as a cost-cutting measure all flying Lynx helicopters stood down on September 2012. At that time there were a couple of new NH90 in service. But this project has many problems so these where scaled down versions, not full Operation capable. Also the number of ASW capable versions are scaled down, 12 are planned as ASW naval helicopters, the other 8 where intended as naval transport helicopters for marines support operations.
  • Surface vessels:
    • -1! only 1 Replenishment ship operational; 1 Joint Support ship in construction, but because of the broad tasks it is supposed to fulfil it couldn’t always function as a replenishment ship. Besides that it is expected that the purposely build Replenishment ship Zr.Ms. Amsterdam (A836) will be sold around 2014. Effectively this means that the capability will be decreased more than just -1. Say -1,5!
    • Frigates:
      • -1!The Air defence frigate was effectively out of service around 2005.
      • -5/6!Originally there have been 8 Multi-Purpose frigates serving the RNLN. These ships where the backbone of Dutch Submarine hunting capacity. During the year 2004 Hr.Ms. Abraham van der Hulst (F832) was sold. Therefore I speak of a loss of 5 frigates compared to the current situation. The Dutch navy has only 2 of these specialized submarine hunting frigates left. Ofcourse we can count in the 2 Belgian ones because they are integrated within the Admiral BENELUX. But for EU/NATo thise meant a loss because they replaced their 3 frigates with two former Dutch MP frigates.
      • 0!The 4 Air defence and Command Frigates still remain in service.
    • 0! The 2 Landing Platform Docks still remain in service.
  • Submarines: 0!The 4 Dutch submarines eventually survived numerous “attacks” of politicians who wanted to get rid of the submarine service. One quote in particular is very interesting because it’s from the current Dutch minister of foreign affairs Timmermans:

Timmermans (Labour), “Yes, but it’s not the answer I want to hear I want to hear that there were no life-sustaining investments would be done in the submarine service.”. When (minister of Defence) Kamp stuck to his point, the parliamentarian Timmermans decided to break with: “Then this decision wil be the nose of the camel and I predict that we will never get rid of the submarine service.”

The Dutch submarine service has lost a lot of “fat from the bones”… it’s a very tiny service with very few personnel. But the effects it can generate is very interesting. They do a far more better job than the Canadians, Australians and many other countries operating the same or more ships with a lot more personnel. All those other services deliver fewer hours at sea at larger cost.

We can say that the RNLN now has a half replenishment ship. A half ship because the Netherlands has a Joint Support Ship, it also has to be used for transport tasks, It can be used as a marines landing ship besides this the Netherlands has to share this ship for several days/hours per year with the German navy.  But as I suggested before there seem to be plans now for a dedicated “simple” Combat Support ship…like the LOGISTIC SUPPORT VESSEL REPLENISHER 20000 off-the-shelf…. So Navy / MoD please buy a “simple” ship and don’t try to develop it yourself…. Other surface ships are still the same at the moment.


Yes I didn’t mention the Ocean Going Patrol Vessels… we have 4 of them, and they are being sold to the politicians and to the public as a great success. I don’t agree. I didn’t mention these ships because I was talking about ships with ASW capability. And there you’ll have it.  This is what I think about these ships – which to be honest – look beautiful and decent.

My critical views on the OPV short sum-up:

  • Tasks for a coastguard like ship which have could be done by less advanced and smaller ships like the Belgians opted for. 2 ships for € 26,6 milion.
  • A civil duty ship but with a heavy canon armament of 1 × 76 mm, 1 × 30 mm Oto Melara Marlin WS, 2 × 12.7 mm Oto Melara Hitrole NT, 6 × 7.62 mm FN MAG machine guns. Yes…… for a Coastguard tasked vessel)
  • A sensor /radar suite (I-mast 400) which normally equips full fletched Frigates… instead of a “civil / coastguard tasked” patrol ship.
  • A large and relative heavy ship like this was needed to accommodate the NH90 helicopter.. and that is just because the navy didn’t want the (leftist polictical) arguments… oh, you need less helicopters because you have less ships to equip…
  • A ship like this wouldn’t be bad if it was designed as a ship that was ‘fitted for, but not with’ which means that the ship could be (up or re)-armed from a simple Coastguard suite up to a heavier (equipped) ship which could function as a corvette. What it has meant to be in the original navy ship study of 2005.
  • Also this ship is to slow to be used for military tasks, And this issue isn’t really an option to do anything about, technical specialists told me that it just isn’t possible to squeeze more knots out of this vessel… and that’s what the political left wanted and get thanks to Mr. Hans van Baalen. (yes, that one, shouting from Maidan square, selling his soul to the big car industry e.g.)
  • There is one positive note: because of these ships the frigates can be dedicated for other roles. But as I said earlier, this could have been done with other, smaller, less expensive and less advanced vessels. And no, I don’t believe the OPV’s will ever be used in the South-China Sea, the gulf or the Horn of Africa, since this could be the result for that unfortunate OPV. so claiming these ships will be used for global roles is not a reality and not necessary, smaller ships will be faster, and helicopters could be made available from the near land bases. But even Damen has designed and build several patrol boats. One of the bigger alternatives would for example be the

That’s it for now, stay tuned!


Why then talk of a “navy decade”?

In the latest blog I went into details of the material project of the JSF an it’s “related’ projects which first were part of the JSF project and it’s budget…. Why does the RNLN expect a “navy” decade? As you can see, I have my questions about this, but ofcourse I would like to give my views on it as well.

The  the glorious navy decade to come!


The Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN) is planning the replacement of its mine countermeasures (MCM) vessels, its M-Frigates and replacement of its four Walrus class submarines.

The replacements for the M-Frigate are scheduled to be delivered between 2024 and 2029 with the first two to be sent to the Netherlands. The project began two years ago with requirements and specifications completed and the new frigates will be optimised for anti-submarine warfare.

Models of the frigate designs shown during the presentation, revealed ships between 4,500 and 6,000 tonnes.

Some of the RNLN’s weapon systems are also scheduled for upgrade or renewal. Hofkamp said that the replacement of the Harpoon ship missile system will begin shortly, while the Netherlands is also looking into a new torpedo defence system for 2024 and beyond.

The MCM vessels will incorporate more unmanned systems, as is the trend with the renewal of MCM platforms.

‘We will build a ship to operate with all that unmanned gear… and launch and recover it up to sea state three or four,’ said the captain.

It is likely that the MCM vessels will be equipped with two USVs, up to 15m in length, and Hofkamp said the vessel itself will be around 80-90m.

The requirements for the MCM have been completed and the project is now in the specifications phase.

The nation is also looking at a fast replacement for its combat support ship with a new design. ‘We need it quick,’ said Hofkamp, ‘It should be in the water around 2022.’

Lees verder

The Royal Netherlands Navy decade…..?

Yes, there is news from the Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN) that they hope to build new vessels. Well after all Air Force projects have been finalized and budgeted… This blog takes you from the drama queen: JSF (and it’s lobbyists) to the new building plans from the navy – for Frigates, Submarines, Mine Counter Measure vessels and even a new Combat Support ship…. Dedicated. Ofcourse the OPV and JSS will get some incoming fire from my side… but start your read here.

Good news… or to early?
A couple of weeks ago there was an interesting article where RNLN captain Sebo Hofkamp was quoted saying : ‘Now it is our decade’. He meant that after all the (troubled) RNLAF projects (with the focus on All American (except the tanker from Airbus which doesn’t fit to the DutchForce21 plans) JSF and CH47F main weapons systems projects it will be the turn of the Navy. Well, in theory yes… in practice no! Why because of the JSF and all projects which the Ministry of Defense put on top of the current budget. In fact you could say it’s a scam to our parliament and our people.

Lees verder


Wowy Look what i found:

The Army is creating an experimental combat unit to develop new tactics for lethally fast-paced future battlefields. The Multi-Domain Task Force will be “a relatively small organization…1,500 or so troops,” the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Mark Milley, told the Future of Warfare conference here this morning. While small, it will have capabilities not found in the building block of today’s Army, the 4,000-strong brigade. “That organization will be capable of space, cyber, maritime, air, and ground warfare,” he said, extending its reach into all domains of military operations to support the Air Force, Navy, and Marines.

“It’s got a bunch of capabilities, and that’s what we’re going to play with to figure out what’s the right mix,” Lt. Gen. Joseph Anderson, the deputy chief of staff for operations (G-3/5/7), told reporters at last week’s Association of the US Army conference. “It’s got some aviation. It’s got some maneuver. It’s got signal. It’s got cyber.” In English, that means it has helicopters, infantry and/or tanks, communications troops, and technical troops to protect (and perhaps attack) computer networks.

Nice idea… it looks like the DutchForce21 concept I am developing. But there are a lot of differences.

First of all While the US is developing this experimental unit they will find out that their goals and practical solutions won’t work. Why? Because their equipment, their weapon systems aren’t designed anymore to be self-sufficient, to operate dispersed. Mainly systems like the JSF need to be based on sophisticated airbases, which need lots of protection, equipment, defenses and other measures to protect the much to expensive bombers. Then there is the refueling, the rearming with special equipment, the need to test the stealth.


The way the US wants to fight their wars is with Hi-priced weapon systems (even against low cost opponents. (destroying a 10.000 Dollar drone with a 3 Million Dollar missile).  So practically they want to equip this multi domain force with the wrong (weapon)systems. If they want t do this, they need the DutchForce21 solutions toolbox.

We will offer:

  • GripenE; which can operate from unprepared runways and road strips, dispersed operating very near the fighting forces. The reserve materials, ammunition and fuel can be flown in by Hercules or even helicopter. Or just with simple trucks. This also degreases the dependence on Airborne tankers and other high value targets.
  • C130 Hercules (or equivalents) in several options; transport, tanker, AEW&C, EW and MPA Ground Fire Support (Harvest Hawk option) will take care of transport an logistics. This aircraft type can also operate very near the battlefield.
  • Helicopters: Well we all know their capabilities but let them also be as cheap to operate and serviceable in the field as possible. Yes we need the LSH, Apache (or newer cheaper replacement) Chinook and Cougar/Caracal and some special NH90 versions if needed.
  • We need some smart Air defense systems, with low logistical tails, not only the expensive Patriot batteries.. but very mobile and able to support even the most expeditionary operations.
  • A ground combat elelment consisting of a reinforced infantry battaljon or regiment whatever you call it. Infantry plus mobility enhancements and firesupport units… with.. yes again as much expeditionary fighting power as possible.. so NO PH2000 will be able to do this.. we need systems like the CEASAR 155mm or maybe even towed systems. I also prefer some 120mm NEMO mortar systems… which can also be used as direct fire support vehicles when they are armed with the LAHAT missile with a effective range of about 8 km. In this case they can double as tanks… without the very heavy machines to be flown in in great numbers.. (which they practically can’t … be flown in I mean..) Besides this we need more 35mm direct Fire support vehicles.. in my solution to do the best we can with the poor systems we have now… lets put this on the Fennek MRAT and Mortar variants… so they can be (re)armed with 35mm RCWS or LAHAT missile launchers on a RC-turret. Do the best we can with these poor machines. Together with the great reconnaissance vehicles of the same name they will make a great hunter – killer team.  Oh yes, I want include drones within this reconnaissance concept.. because in the end they will have a task which belongs here.. .and not in the air domain.
  • Then we need good expeditionary logistics. A concept with getting as much firepower – and direct fire support without over sizing the logistical system. What can be done green?

But, I say it again. I really believe the US Army and even the Marines aren’t able to form these kind of expeditionary units effectively because they don’t want to have the right equipment for that. Instead they make a smart idea – unsmart by putting loads and loads of expensive systems in it, which means behind every warfighter there will be the need of services, and logisitics which make it not capable of operating unnoticed and without high standard facilities like a hangar with temperature constantly on 15 degrees. 😊


DutchForce21 Een veelzijdig inzetbare krijgsmacht met een maritieme focus

De situatie van de Nederlandse krijgsmacht is treurig. De Landmacht is volledig opgeknipt in deeltjes en samengevoegd met Duitse eenheden. Eenheden die niet over gevechtskracht beschikken om offensieve operaties uit te voeren. Wat ze wel kunnen is vredesmissies, vredesmissies en nog eens vredesmissies. (oh ja, en politie missies.) De Luchtmacht is volledig afhankelijk van de USAF en Lockheed Martin. Zelfs de helikopteropleidingen zijn allemaal Amerikaans, de vliegers leren eerst in de VS op een lichte Bell helikopter vliegen, vervolgens leren ze de Black Hawk te bedwingen en de Chinook en Apache vliegers stappen dan over op die toestellen en de NH90 vliegers moeten dan weer overstappen op de NH 90. De Focus op de JSF zorgt ook voor een totale afhankelijkheid van de VS. Nederland kan met dat toestel letterlijk niets meer zelfstandig beslissen en zal volledig door de VS worden gedomineerd. De Marine is nog één van de meest zelfstandig opererende onderdelen, maar de samenwerking met Duitsland (naast de reeds bestaande samenwerking met België ) doet die capaciteiten geen goed. Het grootste probleem hierbij is de veroudering van het materieel en het gebrek aan oppervlakteschepen.  Naast een groter budget voor defensie is het ook vooral nodig dat de beschikbare middelen beter en effectiever worden besteed. DF21 zal dan ook een rigoureus defensieplan  doorvoeren.

DF21 geeft de nieuwe regering de volgende reorganisatieplannen mee:

  • Organiseer de krijgsmacht op de meest effectieve  – economisch en duurzaam verantwoorde manier – die tevens de belangen van het Koninkrijk het beste dient: Een maritieme oriëntatie;
  • De reorganisatie moet recht doen aan de historische werkelijkheid en tradities en tegelijkertijd een moderne en efficiënte organisatie creëren;
  • Vereenvoudiging van structuren:
    • C3I4
    • Logistiek
    • Opleiding
  • Vergroten van de operationele output; Door betere, betaalbaardere wapensystemen. Slimmere commandovoering en integratie van land,- lucht-, zee-, en logistieke eenheden tot op de laagste niveaus. Dit is mogelijk door expeditionaire capaciteiten te vergroten. Het is mogelijk, door de juiste systemen aan te schaffen om een battlegroup in te richten waarbij infanterie tot en met helikopters en straaljagers binnen die battlegroup kunnen worden ingedeeld zonder dat daar grote afstanden overbrucht moeten worden, bijvoorbeeld door zeer kostbare tankertoestellen in de lucht te houden. Nee de straaljagers kunnen vrijwel direct in het operationeel gebied worden gehuisvest vanaf mobiele voorwaartse operating bases.
  • Joint organisatie in meest pure vorm.


Lees verder

Do you know what a SLOC is?

Well it stands for Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC) and it’s more important than you may think. in this age of digital worldwide web, we (and our governments) seem to have forgotten how we get our stuff and all the things we need to live from A to B. Yes you may order your things on Internet, through Ebay, Amazon or some fancy Chinese webstores. But the next thing will be to ship it from A(sia) to B (or Europe:) ofcourse most of these goods come to Europe through our Dutch Main port of Rotterdam. Yes im proud of that.

Well just see and observe this visualization of the world’s shipping routes

“Just remember what DutchForce21 is all about. A maritime focus to (Dutch) armed forces, just because this is the reality.”

About 11 billion tons of stuff gets carried around the world every year by large ships. Clothes, flat-screen TVs, grain, cars, oil — transporting these goods from port to port is what makes the global economy go ‘round.

And now there’s a great way to visualize this entire process, through this stunning interactive map from the UCL Energy Institute

Some previous articles:


Nederlandse toevoeging:

Iedereen die dit fimpje ziet, begrijpt hopelijk direct waarom Dutchforce21 de krijgsmacht een maritieme focus wil geven! En ook waarom dit op een expeditionaire manier zal moeten… en dus de JSF totaal ongeschikt is!!

Lees de serie:



Voortgang van JSF huidige stand van zaken

Apetrots zijn ze erop, De JSF komt naar Nederland, en daarmee troeven ze de Farnborough Air Show in Groot Britannië af, die vorig jaar deze primeur voorbij moest laten gaan…. omdat er toen problemen met de JSF waren (ongelukje) en daarom de oversteek niet kon maken. De kans is groot dat het dit jaar wel lukt… maar dat Nederland het voor hun Britse neus wegkaapt…. wauw.


Voornaamste rol voor JSF… deep strike en vliegend sensor platform.

De overtocht van een JSF is heel goed mogelijk… kijk maar hoe de Italianen het deden door een Italiaans productietoestel over te vliegen naar de VS. met alle logistieke support van dien natuurlijk. Wat een gedoe om één toestel van A naar B(eter) te krijgen zeg! 

A Relatively Short Crossing

The southern route across the Atlantic, through the Azores, is about 7,280 km long, broken down into 3,120 km from Cameri to Lajes (1,675 n.m.) and 4,150 km from Lajes to Pax River (2,240 n.m.)

During the first leg, the F-35 refuelled three times; assuming it took off with a full fuel load, it consumed four fuel loads during the first leg, or an average distance of 418 n.m. per fuel load.

During the second leg, the F-35 refuelled four times and, again assuming it took off with full tanks, the total increases to five, or an average distance of 448 n.m. per fuel load.

It is worth observing that the second leg, which according to official reports was flown with “headwinds of up to 120 knots,” actually used less fuel per mile than the first leg, during which no adverse weather or headwinds are mentioned.


Software – Verouderde software en systeem architectuur (bijvoorbeeld Windows 7?)

Er is een hoop gezegd en geschreven over de Joint Strike Fighter en de Nederlandse deelname daaraan. Wij zijn van mening dat er veel niet klopt aan dit project, maar wat telkens weer terug komt zijn de problemen met de software. Het gaat hier te ver om diep in te gaan op wat er dan niet klopt maar het begint al met  het feit dat software voor besturing en EW door elkaar heen geschreven zijn en niet separaat, dit betekend dat als er iets gewijzigd word aan de besturingssoftware dat dit dan gevolgen heeft voor de EW data. De reden hiervoor is dat het concept van de JSF dateert van het begin van de jaren 90. Andere fabrikanten gebruiken een modulaire besturingssoftware waarbij dingen gescheiden zijn. Men kan als het ware apps invoegen naar gelang de missie.

Lees het stukje hieronder over Open systems architecture Bedenk goed de “uiteindelijke JSF productietoestellen voor Nederland stromen in vanaf 2019 is de planning…. en dan vanaf 2023 zou dan de software (en de belangrijkste hardware systemen motoren en Electro Optical System (EOTS) “vernieuwd” moeten worden?)

But Bogdan said the program would require a switch to a so-called open systems architecture by around 2023, which would make it easier to swap out sensors and other equipment on the aircraft in the future. He said the program would draw lessons from the Air Force’s new B-21 long-range bomber program, which is being designed from the start with such an open architecture.

Het gaat zoals gezegd om een nieuwe motor en EOTS sensor systeem, door Mindef als top of the bill verkocht. En wat lezen we nu?  De JSF moet een nieuwe Update krijgen, en een nieuw Open Architecture System… iets wat standaard is ingebouwd in de Saab GripenE (en zelfs in de huidige C/D variant… eigenlijk al vanaf de A/B). Ik wil hier bij opmerken dat het leuk is om zoals gezegd nieuwe sensorsystemen in te kunnen bouwen. maar er zijn twee beperkende factoren. 1. de Buitenkant van de JSF kan en mag niets aan worden gedaan (STEALTH) en 2. intern is er weinig ruimte… derde mogelijke factor minder waarschijnlijk: sensoren en systemen worden steeds lichter qua gewicht. Het zou dus best mogelijk zijn dat nieuwe sensoren qua gewicht ingebouwd moeten kunnen worden. Punt is wel dat deze systemen wel specifiek voor de JSF moeten worden gebouwd…. andere toestellen kunnen echt modulair worden aangepast wat veel goedkoper is!

Conclusie:  Toestellen als de Gripen zijn door Defensie bestempeld als inferieur, achterhaald, verouderd…. en nu zien we dat de JSF (die al bijna 20 jaar in ontwikkeling is, en ruim 10 jaar in productie) zelf verouderd is voordat ze in dienst genomen kan worden! 

Internet security – Verplicht Uploaden en downloaden info van en naar de VS
Wat we zien bij de JSF is dat er verschillende zorgen zijn die direct invloed hebben op ons hele land. De Nederlandse JSF’s zullen straks voorafgaand aan iedere vlucht en na afloop van iedere vlucht hun data moeten gaan uploaden naar de Verenigde Staten. Alle data is eigendom van de Verenigde Staten, wij mogen het als het ware gebruiken.. Dit brengt echter enorme risico’s met zich mee. Als deze uploads niet gebeuren zijn de JSF toestellen nutteloos. Men kan er niets mee.

The F-35 is entirely dependent on the ALIS system for its maintenance, and on US-based software laboratories for its mission data loads, so that its operation requires secure and high-speed Internet links between its operating bases and the US. 

Korte samenvatting van het artikel is te vinden in een vorige blog. European countries and their quest for sovereignty !

  • USG decided unilateral that all software laboratories should be on US territory, also Operation & Sustainment (O&S) also managed from US territory.
  • The JSF needs permanent data exchanges, before and after every sortie
  • ALIS can, and has, prevented aircraft taking off because of an incomplete data file.
  • the volume of data that must travel to and from the United States is gigantic, and any disruption in Internet traffic could cripple air forces as the F-35 cannot operate unless it is logged into, and cleared by, ALIS.
  • “undersea Internet cables are surprisingly vulnerable.”
  • “Russian submarines and spy ships are aggressively operating near the vital undersea cables that carry almost all global Internet communications, raising concerns among some American military and intelligence officials that the Russians might be planning to attack those lines in times of tension or conflict.”
  • “ultimate Russian hack on the United States could involve severing the fiber-optic cables at some of their hardest-to-access locations to halt the instant communications on which the West’s governments, economies and citizens have grown dependent,”
  • If the F-35 performs as advertised, it should gather very argue amounts of tactical data during each mission – data that it will have to transmit to the software labs in the US so they can be used to update the mission data files, adding another large volume data flow in both directions.
  • The OT&E report mentions that “Maintenance downloads using the ground data receptacle … usually takes an hour, delaying access to maintenance information.” This is an indication of the data volume involved, especially as the upgraded ALIS runs on a standard Windows 7 operating system.
  • “Currently, the pilot debrief timeline is too long as it takes approximately 1.5 hours to download a 1.5 hour flight. This is unacceptable and [we] are in the process of fielding an improved system [which] will decrease the timeline to download mission data by a factor of 8, meaning a 1.5 hour flight will be downloaded in about fifteen minutes,” he told the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces of the House Armed Services Committee on Oct 21.
  • The USG will manage the entire global fleet, and we are bound to their rules. And we will be able to operate only when and where the USG wants us to operate.
  • What we read here should have impact on decision making in Europe within each JSF partner country.
  • The non-U.S. operator will not be able to use its own intelligence data to update the EW system, or the “fusion engine” used to identify targets, or modify the system to defeat cyber threats, without the active cooperation of U.S. personnel in the Reprogramming Labs.
  • Our Aircraft can fly…. but they can’t operate!

Het risico voor ons land moge duidelijk zijn. Nederland zit straks opgescheept met 35 + 2 test JSF, die met name bedoeld is voor strategische bombardementen (en niet Multi Role zoals de JSF lobby altijd heeft beweerd).  Feitenmateriaal, ook uit de VS spreekt dat tegen. bijvoorbeeld voormalig U.S. Air Force Air Combat Command Gen Hostage:

“If I do not keep that F-22 fleet viable, the F-35 fleet frankly will be irrelevant. The F-35 is not built as an air superiority platform. It needs the F-22,” says Hostage to Air Force Times.

Testen – vooruitschuiven of zelfs annuleren van tests om maar de snelle punten te scoren

En dan het voortgangsrapport JSF van onze minister: prachtig al die testpunten bijvoorbeeld. Maar wist je dat ze die overdaad aan punten halen door makkelijke dingen te testen, (die ze naar voren halen) en andere issues te passeren door ze te verschuiven…. of gewoon niet te testen?

Ook de operationele tests en zelfs “computer” simulaties worden volgens ooggetuigen letterlijk beïnvloed: (zie dit verslag aan het Australische parlement)

35 Lt.Col Anker Sorensen (Rtd) (PDF 35 KB) 


I’m a retired Lieutenant Colonel from the Royal Danish Air force. I have flown the F-16 for 16 years. Been Squadron Commander, Base Commander Operations, Base Commander and Inspector General Flight Safety Armed Forces Denmark. In my career I also worked at Air Force Tactical Command and was responsible for the operational requirements for new fighter aircraft. In this connection I repeatedly took part in simulated flights with Joint Strike Fighter at Wright Patterson AFB in the United States and also in England.

On one of these simulations, I had a Danish test pilot with me. In addition, there were participants from a number of other countries. We also simulated Joint Strike Fighter against Russian fighter aircraft where we flew two against two.

In the forenoon I and the Danish test pilot was flying Joint Strike Fighters against two Russian fighters. In the afternoon we swapped, so we flew Russian fighter aircraft against the Joint Strike Fighter. In the afternoon the first thing the test pilot and I noticed was that the Russian fighters was not loaded with the best air-to-air missiles as the Russians have in real life. We therefore asked about getting some better. It was denied us.

We two pilots complained but it was not changed. My test pilot and I decided in our simulated Russian combat aircraft to fly “line abreast”, but with 25 nautical miles distance. Then at least one of us could with radar look into the side of the Joint Strike Fighter and thus view it at long distance. The one who “saw” the Joint Strike Fighter could then link the radar image to the other. Then missiles could be fired at long distance at the Joint Strike Fighter. It was also denied us, although we protested this incomprehensible disposition.

It was now quite clear to us that with the directives and emotional limitations simulations would in no way give a true and fair view of anything. On the other hand, it would show that the Joint Strike Fighter was a good air defense fighter, which in no way can be inferred from the simulations. We spoke loudly and clearly that this way was manipulating with the Joint Strike Fighter air defence capability. Because of these circumstances, I would not let the Danish Air Force be included as part of the totally misleading/non-transparent results, which alone would show Joint Strike Fighters superiority in the air defence role, which it would not have been against an opponent with missiles with a far better Joint Strike Fighter Submission 35 performance than those who we were given permission to. Also there was given major obstacles in the way flying tactically against the Joint Strike Fighter. We therefore left simulations, returned to Denmark and complained to the Chief of Staff Tactical Air Command and technical manager Air Material Command. Due to these conditions and having insight into what else was going on, attempts were made from the Danish side to get an operational pilot to the Joint Program Office but due to some special circumstances it at that time failed. With my speech, I would like to draw attention to the fact that at least some of the air to air simulations that have been carried out, in no way give a true and fair view of the Joint Strike Fighter in the air defence role. I consider it to be a disaster if simulations as mentioned above are accepted and thus forms part of a possible decision to choose the Joint Strike Fighter.

SO test results in the case of the JSF don’t say anything, if it’s preplanned and according to best outcome of the JSF itself.

Op 11 December kwam  Michael Gilmore, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation Office of the Secretary of Defense met zijn rapport.

On 11 December 2015, Dr Michael Gilmore, in a memorandum (attached) to the Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, officially advised of ‘Concerns with Plans for F-35 System Development and Follow-On Development’; here is the opening paragraph: The current “official schedule” to complete full development and testing of all Block 3F capabilities by 31 July 2017, is not realistic.It could be achieved only by eliminating a significant number of currently planned test points, tripling the rate at which weapons delivery events have historically been conducted, and deferring resolution of significant operational deficiencies to Block 4. In fact, I learned very recently that the program is currently considering reducing by two thirds the number of planned weapons delivery events (per the approved Test and Evaluation Master Plan) for weapons certification. This course of action, if followed, constitutes a very high risk of failing Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E). (My bolding) Under US law, if a weapon system fails Initial Operational Test and Evaluation, it cannot legally go into full-rate production. The USA has cancelled large weapons system after failure to reach required operational capability; examples are the Navy A-12 Avenger II Stealth Fighter / Attack aircraft cancelled 7 January 1991 and the Army RAH-66 Comanche Attack Helicopter cancelled 24 February 2004.

Lezen we hierover iets terug in het voortgangsrapport van Defensie over de JSF?  Nee alleen een terloopse opmerking dat DOT&E nog altijd problemen ziet in de “software” en dat ze claimt dat de Block3F software pas in 2018 bruikbaar zal zijn…. maar dat maakt niet uit, Nederlandse JSF’jes stromen pas vanaf 2019 in en de IOC is gepland voor 2021.

In de tussentijd ligt geen enkel ding de bestelling van de eerste echte 8 “productie” JSF in de weg. Alles gaat zoals het hoort… bij de JSF. Niet goed, maar we doen het toch! Meer hierover op

Alle logica spreekt tegen de aanschaf van de JSF voor Nederland (andere landen kunnen zowel een bommenwerper als Air Superiority fighter aanschaffen, maar kleine landen kunnen zich dat niet veroorloven.) De meerderheid van de Tweede Kamer kiest dus opzettelijk voor een toestel dat ongeschikt is voor Nederlands gebruik… De luchtmacht wil het toestel graag maar waarom zijn zij niet eerlijk hierover? Deze leugens—- want dat zijn het, men wist het omdat ook de Amerikaanse Luchtmacht het weet! — in combinatie met de oneerlijke manier van kandidatenvergelijking maakt dit tot een democratisch debacle… ten top.

Als je naar het gehele “defensie” plaatje kijkt zijn de gevolgen van de JSF schikbarend. Zie het wegbezuinigen van capaciteiten (om lagere exploitatiekosten te hebben – feit is dat de exploitatiekosten van de JSF die gaten weer opvullen… want 37 JSF kosten meer in exploitatie dan 68 F-16… met minder vluchten per toestel! En het is die Airpower die de verloren gegane gevechtskracht van Landmacht en Marine zou moeten opvangen…. als het er op aankomt!

Ja de Luchtmacht wil de JSF. (al sinds de jaren 90 van de vorige eeuw… nu zo’n 20 jaar geleden alweer.. waarvan de JSF al zo’n 10 jaar in ontwikkeling is.. nog altijd niet operationeel, hoewel de JSF fans dat wel beweren.. maar wat is operationele inzet? Dat is wat onze F-16’s doen, en daar is nog geen enkele JSF toe in staat. Ook die van de USMC niet, die inmiddels de operationele status zeggen te hebben. DOT&E, en GAO spreken dit tegen.. maar toch…)   De Koninklijke Luchtmacht heeft de JSF verkocht als het een echt multirole toestel. Hoewel de VS in al haar publicaties duidelijk is… het is een strategische bommenwerper  die (ongezien zonder enkele bedreiging ) haar doel kan bestoken. Daarvoor hoefde ze in eerste instantie ook geen lange-afstandswapens in te zetten.. Dat is tenslotte het argument van NL JSF lobby ministerie tegen de 4e generatie toestellen, die dat wel nodig zouden hebben inmiddels wil men in de JSF ook dergelijke wapens integreren, en heeft men in Nederland het plan voor een aanvullend wapen….). Multi-rol mn neus dus…. feitelijk (volgens de Amerikanen zelf) is het toestel niet (meer) geschikt/bedoeld voor de twee belangrijkste redenen voor de Nederlandse krijgsmacht. Zoals die altijd geweest is, en zoals dat hoort te zijn voor een relatief klein land, met een relatief kleine krijgsmacht. Zonder deze factoren heeft het hebben van iedere andere capaciteit (in de lucht) nauwelijk zin. Zeker niet omdat ook andere capaciteiten die “gedeeltelijk” in de behoefte zouden kunnen voorzien zijn wegbezuinigd.  (denk aan Tanks, Vermindering van Artillerie denk aan Long-Range Guided Weapons / YPR-PRAT, denk aan de PRTL (mobiel wapenysteem tegen luchtdoelen…)  De twee voornaamste taken van het “luchtwapen” voor Nederland zijn:

1. Luchtverdediging / air superiority zie bv opmerking USAF gen. Hostage over de irrelevantie vd JSF als de F22 vloot er niet zou zijn.

2. CAS… het aanvallen van gronddoelen in rechtstreekse ondersteuning van eigen grondgebonden eenheden.

Voornaamste rol voor JSF… deep strike en vliegend sensor platform.  Met verouderde sensoren en gedeeltelijk stealth maar zichtbaar met IRST (infrarood) passieve radar.. en SMART-L radar van Thales Nederland. (zie uitzending hierover 13:45)  Als het aan Dutchforce21 ligt zou een derde primaire taak aan het “luchtwapen” worden toegevoegd c.q. in ere worden hersteld. De capaciteit om het maritieme gevecht vanuit de lucht te ondersteunen door Maritiem Patrouillevliegtuigen en de beschikking over wapens tegen oppervlakteschepen in een A2/D2 rol.

En dat alles veel te duur in aanschaf en exploitatie. En (mede) verantwoordelijk voor de afbraak van de rest van de krijgsmacht en afhankelijkheid van Airpower 35+2 JSF + 30 Apache helikopters. Die feitelijk niet in staat zullen zijn om 24/7 onder alle omstandigheden te opereren. Bedankt Luchtmacht en JSF lobbyisten, en politici die de JSF mogelijk hebben gemaakt…..!